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RESEARCH ARTICLE
War Economy, Governance and Security 
in Syria’s Opposition-Controlled Areas
Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic and Rim Turkmani
This paper explores links between the war economy and civilian security by using 
evidence from the three opposition-held areas in Syria. The study of Eastern 
Ghouta, Daraa and Atareb shows how different type of behavior by non-state 
armed groups engaged in criminal war economy, shaped by the broader war 
economy conditions, impacts on the ability of the local populations to address their 
security predicaments. Our findings will challenge the assumption prevalent in the 
scholarship on the war economy that civilian security is unequivocally undermined 
by insurgents’ criminal war economy dealings. We show that in some local contexts 
a diverse range of economic choices and actors provide the local population with 
more opportunities to develop coping strategies by engaging in different parts of 
the war economy.
Introduction
Scholars argue that, a thriving war economy 
is one of the factors that is contributing to 
the persistence of armed conflict in Syria 
(Yazigi 2014: 7; Herbert 2014: 69; Ohl et al. 
2015: 8; Steenkamp 2017: 1; Al Abdeh 2013). 
It is said that since the start of the war in 
2011, the proliferation of lucrative criminal 
activities, through looting, bribery, extortion, 
kidnapping, human trafficking, the illegal 
trade in oil, weapons, drugs and antiquities, 
illegal migration and document forgery, has 
created vested interests. This observation 
particularly applies to the myriad of insur-
gent armed groups, for whom the extraction 
of resources from the war economy is alleged 
to have reinforced incentives to continue 
fighting (Yazigi 2014: 4).
Such claims echo a prominent argument 
in scholarship on contemporary warfare that 
emphasises the criminalization of the war 
economy and portrays its armed protagonists 
as violent entrepreneurs who pursue military 
combat alongside self-enrichment (Cockayne 
2010; Raeymaekers 2014; Wennmann 2007; 
Cramer 2006). A common view holds that 
the pursuit of economic agendas by armed 
groups harms wider community interests and 
aggravates human suffering in zones of con-
flict. In that sense, Syria’s combat landscape 
provides an abundance of evidence that ordi-
nary Syrians in opposition-controlled areas 
struggle to provide for their basic needs, 
while combatants pursue their illicit business 
in the war economy, epitomised most visibly 
in armed groups’ engagement in the smug-
gling of antiquities (Steenkamp 2017; Vigual 
2017; Khalaf 2015; Al Mahmoud 2015).
While such accounts of the conduct of 
non-state armed groups in Syria are broadly 
accurate, the actual local war economy 
stability
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dynamics in terms of the combinations 
of actors, activities and their interactions 
around extraction and distribution of 
resources, display significant variation. The 
war economy in Syria is diffused due to the 
extreme territorial, political and economic 
fragmentation associated with the diver-
sity of protagonists involved in the conflict, 
and the variable opportunities provided for 
resource extraction (Yazigi 2014: 6; Lock 
2005). Consequently, various arrangements 
among different actors – enemies or compet-
itors – are forged to extract resources from 
the war economy, affecting the security of 
the local population in multiple and ambigu-
ous ways (Vigual 2017: 815–816).
The main motivation behind this paper is 
to take a fresh look at the debates on the war 
economy and its impact on civilian security. 
Civilian security is understood to mean pro-
tection from exploitation by armed groups 
and an opportunity for self-security through 
the application of different coping strategies 
(Hart-Lidow 2016: 5; Darby 2009: 709).
The main argument we put forward is two-
fold one. Firstly, we contend that a criminal-
ity perspective, which posits the public as 
the victim of the war economy, provides an 
oversimplified explanation of the impact of 
non-state armed actors’ economic agendas 
on civilian security. Secondly, we highlight 
that the economic activities of insurgent 
groups take place within a broader military, 
security and economic context that deter-
mines the availability of resources and the 
types of actors involved as well as the activi-
ties and interactions that influence how 
people respond to war-induced uncertainty. 
The broader context needs to be considered 
when analysing the link between the war 
economy and civilian security.
This study of the three opposition-held 
areas in Syria shows that the pursuit of the 
illicit activities by non-state armed groups is 
compatible with different behavior towards 
other local actors around resource extraction 
and distribution. Overall, where the war econ-
omy was more diverse and there was more 
interaction among the opposition armed 
groups and other local actors, the population 
had more opportunities to engage in differ-
ent parts of the war economy, and to develop 
strategies to cope with the harmful impact 
of the exploitative practices of armed groups.
Methodology
Empirically, we investigated three opposi-
tion-held areas in Syria: Eastern Ghouta, the 
Daraa countryside, and Atareb in the Aleppo 
countryside. During the research period 
(February-June 2015), no single opposition 
armed group exercised control of the territo-
ries or made attempts to organize the provi-
sion of public goods and services. Opposition 
armed groups consisted mostly of locally-
recruited personnel with limited to no pres-
ence of extremist, transnationally recruiting 
groups such as Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN)1 and 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). 
All three are mainly agricultural areas with 
local industry and trade primarily related to 
agriculture.
The crucial differences among the three 
areas are due to their respective geostra-
tegic positions.2 At the time of research, 
Eastern Ghouta was under siege and sur-
rounded by government forces. Daraa has a 
well-controlled border with Jordan, allowing 
the passage of humanitarian aid while also 
restricting the movement of arms and fight-
ers. Atareb lies along the Turkish border, in a 
region where fewer restrictions are imposed 
on the entry of goods and people into Syria 
(Vigual 2017: 820). This provides a variation 
in the conditions in which the war economy 
operates allowing for the observation of dif-
ferent patterns of interaction among its pro-
tagonist as well as the analysis of variations 
in the responses of the local populations to 
cope with the impact of the economic activi-
ties of armed groups.
The fieldwork for this paper involved face-
to-face and Skype interviews with citizens 
in the three localities. Stakeholders con-
sulted included civil society members, the 
members of local administrative councils, 
members of armed groups, media represent-
atives, and businessmen.3 Interview data was 
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complemented by extensive desk research 
of reports, media content, and scholarly 
articles. We also interviewed donor agen-
cies, UN agencies and international non- 
governmental organizations. Triangulation 
of the research findings included several 
consultations with international and Syrian 
experts and activists, and two focus group 
discussions with representatives from civil 
society and media organizations.
The paper first provides a brief review of 
debates on the contemporary war economy 
and war-time governance. The empirical 
section then uses the three case studies to 
analyze three aspects of the war economy: 
the criminal economy involving insurgent 
groups; interactions among a range of local 
actors around the extraction and distribution 
of resources in the war economy; and the 
responses of the local population. The con-
cluding section summarizes the findings and 
reflects on how this context-specific knowl-
edge contributes to the study of the impact 
of war economies on civilian security in war 
zones.
Unpacking the War Economy and 
Interactions among its Protagonists
Contemporary war economy is convention-
ally understood as including all economic 
activities during war, irrespective of their 
legal status (Keen 2008; Goodhand 2004). 
Yet, scholarship is dominated by accounts of 
the war economy as consisting of manifestly 
criminal and illegal economic practices, with 
the latter comprising illegal trade in other-
wise legal goods4 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Cramer 2006; 
Heupel 2006; Wennmann 2011; Cockayne 
2010). This body of work considers war as 
‘business by other means’ and as a ‘privat-
ized form of self-enrichment’ in which com-
mercial transacting among formally opposed 
groups is a salient practice that financially 
benefits criminal networks, including 
non-state armed groups (Cockayne 2010; 
Raeymaekers 2013; Cramer 2006; Andreas 
2009: 33). From this perspective, the exploi-
tation of the local population through 
predatory practices, including through the 
manipulation and taxation of humanitarian 
aid, is part of the resource extraction strat-
egy of non-state armed groups. The criminal 
war economy controlled by insurgents, pos-
its civilians as helpless victims whose sole 
protection from its harmful effects are the 
various forms of the ‘coping economy’ that 
enables the survival of the local population 
(Wennmann 2005: 483; Pugh et al 2004: 
9; Justino 2013: 2; Péclard and Mechoulan 
2015: 2).
The above perspectives have come under 
criticism from several directions. Gutierezz-
Sanin’s (2003) deconstruction of the ‘crimi-
nal rebels’ thesis demonstrated that there is 
nothing static about the identity of actors, 
their interests and motives for engaging in 
the war economy and behavior towards other 
actors. Rather, Gutierezz-Sanin (2004) makes 
a point that in contemporary conflicts, politi-
cal, military and profit-seeking agendas of 
non-state armed actors mix in complex ways 
resulting in a variable and fluid constella-
tion of actors, alliances and activities, which 
affect the civilian population in manifold 
ways. Cockayne (2010) argues that although 
the extractive strategies of armed groups are 
inherently coercive, the extent to which the 
population is directly extorted varies, and so 
does the vulnerability of the population to 
the harmful effects of the economic agendas 
of armed groups. The suggestion that the 
various forms of survival economy provide 
the only option for self-protection of the 
local population exposed to non-state armed 
groups’ predation, is premised on a view of 
the formal/legal economy seen through a 
prism of destruction and disruption that 
reduces sources of livelihoods and produc-
tive capacities. Such a view, however, side-
lines the different opportunities that emerge 
through the adaptation of the local economy 
to war conditions, both for violent extrac-
tion as well as for the development of coping 
mechanisms (Palmer 2008: 61; Cramer 2006: 
197; Raeymaekers 2014).
Recent literature on war-time orders has 
challenged another dominant aspect of the 
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criminality perspective on war economy. 
While the criminality perspective associates 
the war economy with disorder and law-
lessness that disproportionately affects the 
civilian populations, research shows that, 
although they are violent actors, rebels are 
often interested in governance and some-
times use the proceeds from the criminal 
war economy to provide common goods 
(Kasfir 2015; Staniland 2012b; Arjona 2014; 
Mampilly 2011; Arjona at al. 2015; Weinstein 
2007: 164–165). The likelihood of chan-
neling the criminal war economy proceeds 
towards the wider community interests 
increases, if those groups are recruited 
locally (Reno 2010: 64; Staniland 2012b: 
143). Other factors that may affect such 
outcomes are not directly addressed, pri-
marily, because the war-orders perspective 
developed through the study of long-lasting 
insurgencies in resource rich countries. Thus, 
while it provides insights into the behavior 
of non-state armed groups, it concomitantly 
downplays the presence of other actors who 
jostle to assert authority over local territo-
ries and fails to emphasize how these actors 
affect the behavior of insurgent groups, in 
general, and around the extraction and dis-
tribution of resources, in particular (Péclard 
and Mechoulan 2015; Hagmann and Péclard 
2010). Literature on war-time orders also 
does not explicitly address war-related local 
economic transformation. This is an impor-
tant gap as there are different adaptation 
patterns in countries influenced by their 
unique economic profiles. Economic pro-
file, such as a manufacturing or agricultural-
based economy or, for that matter, drug 
production and trafficking-based economic 
activity, influences the kinds of activities 
and actors involved as well as the modalities 
of their interactions, with vast differences 
in the impact on the quality of the lives of 
people in war zones (Hart-Lidow 2016: 5; 
Staniland 2012a; Schouten 2016; Palmer 
2008). Ultimately, as argued by Justino et 
al (2013: 300), how non-state armed groups 
negotiate, cooperate, coerce or intimidate 
other local actors to pursue their economic 
agendas, and the consequences such activi-
ties will have on the coping strategies of local 
populations, will depend to an important 
extent on the broader economic landscape, 
and not just its criminal part.
In the following section, these ideas will 
be explored, using evidence from the three 
opposition controlled areas in Syria.
Variegated Pathways of War 
Economy, Governance and Security 
in Syria: Empirical Evidence
The main aim of this section is to describe the 
war economy involving insurgent groups in 
rebel-held areas of Syria, as well as to examine 
interactions among a range of local armed and 
civilian actors around the extraction and distri-
bution of resources, and the responses of local 
populations to protect themselves from the 
harmful effects of the armed groups’ practices. 
The three localities illustrate the different pro-
files of war economy that have emerged in the 
presence of locally-recruited armed groups, 
who make no explicit claim to govern those 
territories.
Eastern Ghouta – A Predatory Insurgency?
Eastern Ghouta lies in the agricultural belt 
of Syria, to the southeast of the capital, 
Damascus. In October 2013, after the insur-
gent armed groups took control of the area, 
the government forces imposed a siege. At 
the time the research was conducted, it was 
the largest besieged area in Syria and subject 
to intense shelling. Entry to Eastern Ghouta 
was only possible through two checkpoints: 
one manned by insurgent groups at the 
Eastern Ghouta side and the other controlled 
by government forces. Underground tunnels 
were also created to surpass these check-
points and to supplement the flow of licit 
and illicit goods. The control over these main 
routes for the circulation of goods and peo-
ple, provided a strategic asset to the armed 
groups on both sides of the conflict. Those 
routes became profitable channels used by 
the opposition groups, regime forces and 
assorted merchants to extract war economy 
resources (Sadaki 2016).
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Eastern Ghouta’s agriculture based pre-war 
economy suffered extensive physical destruc-
tion, including to infrastructure (Al Zoughbi 
2006). A lack of fuel, electricity, water, ferti-
lizers, and fodder, severely disrupted agricul-
tural activity, and the associated processing 
industry, and limited the possibilities for 
legal economic activities during the siege 
(Sadaki 2016).5 Eastern Ghouta inhabitants 
have suffered acute food shortages and 
widespread malnutrition.6 At least 397 civil-
ians have died of starvation since the start 
of the siege (ACAPS 2017). Before the siege, 
the area received over 100,000 internally- 
displaced people (IDPs) (SAMS 2017), which 
has further strained the resource-base and 
coping strategies of the local population.
The criminal war economy and its protagonists
At the time of research, the Islam Army, cre-
ated in 2013 through a merger of some fifty 
opposition groups, was the main non-state 
armed actor operating within the besieged 
area (Lund 2016a: 1). Given the siege, the 
main economic activity comprised of smug-
gling basic commodities, including food and 
fuel, through the checkpoints and tunnels. 
Transporting people across the blockade was 
particularly difficult and risky, but provided 
high profits, up to one million Syrian pounds 
(SYP) per hour, and equivalent of around 
$5,900.7 The first of the tunnels, beneath the 
Damascus-Aleppo Highway, was excavated in 
August 2014 to allow for the entry of human-
itarian aid. This tunnel quickly became a sup-
ply route for the armed groups and a de facto 
commercial enterprise. The daily income 
for rebel groups could be as high as SYP 
15–20 million ($88,000–$118,000).8 More 
tunnels were dug over time; including one 
housing a fuel pipeline as fuel smuggling 
became one of the most profitable busi-
nesses in the Syrian war.
The Islam Army’s control over the sup-
plies of food and fuel meant that prices were 
determined within an illicit network com-
prising of rebel and government forces and 
various merchants with the additional risk-
costs of participating in the war economy 
being passed on to civilians. To pass through 
the tunnels and the checkpoint, a percentage 
of the sales value of the goods was charged 
(Sadaki 2016). Basic goods were sold, by 
armed groups, at highly inflated prices. 
Prices were as high as 55 times their cost in 
Damascus, 15 km away from Eastern Ghouta. 
The price inflation was largely a result of the 
multiple rounds of informal payments that 
occurred before goods could reach the local 
population in Eastern Ghouta.9 While vital to 
ease the strains of war on the local popula-
tion, this lucrative trade provided revenues 
to the Islam Army and to their collaborators 
on the other side of the border, as well as 
for the various entrepreneurs linked to both 
parties, who controlled the market in the 
besieged area (Lund 2016b). As to the impact 
on the local population, the overall effect 
was extreme food insecurity due to the lim-
ited supply and high prices of goods and the 
heightened vulnerability of the local popula-
tion to the extraction strategies of the armed 
groups (Sadaki 2016).
The local actors’ interactions
The struggle for control over the commer-
cial routes across the line of siege initially 
provoked frequent clashes among insurgent 
groups and even led to assassinations (Lund 
2016a; Lund 2016b). To undercut its rivals, 
the Jund Al Asefa armed group colluded with 
government forces, and in February 201510 
blew up the tunnel controlled by the Islam 
Army. Subsequently, the Islam Army cajoled 
smaller groups to merge and could end the 
violent competition over the tunnel. With 
the rival Fajer Al Ummah brigade, the Islam 
Army set up an office to manage the tunnel 
(Syria Deeply 2017a; Syria Deeply 2017b). 
These arrangements resulted in the Islam 
Army being able to exercise tighter control 
over the supply of food, medicine and fuel 
reaching the besieged area.
The relationship between the Islam Army 
and the local civilian structures through the 
Local Administrative Councils (LACs), were 
strained in Eastern Ghouta and, at times, con-
frontational. LACs grew out of the popular 
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mobilization of the Syrian uprising and serve 
as rudimentary civilian governance struc-
tures across the opposition-controlled areas 
with different capacities in different areas 
(Hajjar et al. 2017). Most LACs evolved over 
time and developed organizationally, albeit 
unevenly, to include specialized offices (for 
example, medical, education, and agricul-
ture offices) to respond to the needs of the 
local population. Although formally elected 
by the local population, many LACs are asso-
ciated with different armed groups (Baczko, 
Dorronsoro and Quesnay 2013). Several LACs 
were active in Eastern Ghouta at the time 
of research, of which the one in the city of 
Duma was the most developed (Turkmani et 
al 2015: 45; Angelova 2014).
Given the siege conditions, the LACs in 
Eastern Ghouta were poorly resourced and 
lacked the capacity to respond to the ser-
vice delivery needs of the local population, 
including for the provision of basic goods and 
law and order. Accessing funding available 
through INGOs, which would enable LACs 
to be more effective, was undermined by the 
impact of the resource extraction practices of 
armed groups. For example, LACs were unable 
to accurately project costs to apply for fund-
ing from the INGOs interested in supporting 
agriculture. Even in cases where the funding 
was obtained, price fluctuations could easily 
take the project costs over-budget and under-
mine effective delivery (Turkmani et al 2015). 
The LACs seemed unable to influence the 
armed actors’ activities to curtail costs.
The relationships between the Islam Army, 
the LACs and the local population were 
strained both because of the Islam Army’s 
collusion with the government forces to 
exploit the siege conditions as well as due 
to instances of direct coercion. For exam-
ple, Islam Army commanders allegedly run 
private prisons where a local citizen and a 
LAC member are among a group of prison-
ers (Lund 2016a). Additionally, as part of 
their military strategy, the Islam Army col-
luded with Syrian government forces to pre-
vent civilians from leaving Eastern Ghouta 
(Amnesty International 2015; Sadaki 2016). 
Instances of direct violence against the local 
population through, for example, the seizure 
of land and farms for extortion by armed 
groups added to the antagonism.
Local population coping strategies
Operating the tunnels allowed the insurgents 
to control economic life in the besieged area 
and consequently gave them greater influence 
over the security of its inhabitants, particularly 
compared to under-resourced LACs (Turkmani 
et al 2015). The conditions along the supply 
routes, through the checkpoint and the tun-
nels, dictated the intensity of shortages of vari-
ous goods and their prices. For example, the 
destruction of the tunnel in February 2015 
resulted in acute shortages of food and basic 
commodities. The impact was compounded by 
violence between the Islam Army and its com-
petitors over the control of the main economic 
activities resulting in both reduced food and 
physical security for the population.
The siege not only created the opportu-
nity for armed groups to exert control over 
and extract rent from the provision of basic 
goods, but also severely restricted economic 
opportunities for people in Eastern Ghouta. 
Consequently, the coping strategies that 
civilians could develop were severely circum-
scribed. Movement restrictions and shortages 
of fuel and fertilizers, along with continuous 
shelling, prevented the resumption of viable 
agriculture. This forced many farmers to resort 
to asset divestment and the selling of valuable 
possessions, including livestock, at a fraction 
of their value.
However, some people adapted and 
employed innovative forms of economic 
activity to meet the local demand for goods 
and services. This included, for example, new 
forms of commerce through renting pri-
vately-owned electricity generators and the 
use of organic waste as an alternative fuel 
source.
Daraa- Tamed Predation?
The governorate of Daraa, in the south-west 
of Syria, is under opposition control. Daraa 
Province is demarcated by an international 
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border with Jordan and an internal border 
with the government territory. At the time 
of research, the main road between Daraa 
and Damascus was exposed to intense fight-
ing between government and opposition 
forces, and dotted by multiple checkpoints, 
which hampered the provision of basic sup-
plies and posed protection risks to civilians 
(ACAPS 2014: 9; SNAP 2014).
Although infrastructure and productive 
capacity suffered substantial damage from 
shelling, significant sections of the electricity 
grid were operational and providing over 50 
per cent of health facilities and schools with 
an adequate electricity supply (ACAPS 2014). 
While agriculture and the agriculture-related 
processing industry, which underpinned the 
pre-war economy, were severely disrupted, 
there remained pockets of viable agriculture 
in the northernmost areas (Teitsworth 2013: 
30).
In mid-2013, the controls on the border 
with Jordan increased, restricting the passage 
of people and goods (Lund 2017). Increased 
border controls stemmed the flow of refu-
gees from Syria into Jordan leading Daraa 
to receive some 320,773 IDPs11 further com-
pounding the food insecurity in the area. By 
January 2014, around 20 per cent of Daraa’s 
population was reported to be in acute need 
of food assistance (SNAP 2014).
The criminal war economy and its protagonists
No single opposition armed group con-
trolled the Daraa governorate during the 
period of research. The Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) and moderate Islamist brigades, which 
recruit mostly locally, had the strongest pres-
ence. JAN operated in some pockets in the 
territory.
The armed groups used diverse resource 
extraction strategies in exploiting opportu-
nities provided by a porous informal border 
manned by Syrian government forces and a 
tightly-controlled one run by the Jordanian 
government. Smuggling, including high-
profit margin commodities such as arms, 
fuel, and antiquities, was rife across the bor-
der with the government forces.12 Smuggling 
across the border with Jordan fell sharply 
after the border controls were stepped up, 
but was not curtailed. The illicit economy 
of smuggling operated in concert with the 
informal taxation of trade and people pass-
ing through numerous checkpoints along the 
border with the government forces. The gov-
ernment forces facilitating this trade, imposed 
informal levies on the passing traffic of peo-
ple and goods travelling in both directions 
(Turkmani et al 2015). The fees were high and 
beyond what most bona fide businessmen 
could afford. For example, freezer trucks were 
charged around SYP 150,000 (US$880) to pass 
and a truck loaded with vegetables around 
SYP 15–20,000 (US$88–120) depending on 
the weight of the cargo. Sometimes the truck 
and the cargo would be confiscated and the 
driver forced to pay the bribe to get it back 
(Turkmani et al 2015).
Another stream of illicit revenue extrac-
tion included the manipulation of humani-
tarian aid by networks of armed actors and 
the smugglers enjoying their protection. 
A steady supply of aid was provided from 
Jordan under the UN auspices. A more lim-
ited supply of humanitarian aid was also 
transported across the borders with the gov-
ernment force. Some of the humanitarian 
aid found its way to the local stall markets 
(Turkmani et al 2015: 32). Some market stalls 
operated as enterprises run by shadow busi-
nessmen who enjoyed free movement across 
the border with the government forces under 
their protection as well as the protection by 
the FSA. Smuggled arms were also available 
for purchase at the market stalls.
Other forms of illicit activities in Daraa are 
oil smuggling, especially through the desert13 
and Swedia14 and various forms of informal 
taxation of goods as well as different types 
of criminal trade due to its specific geostrate-
gic, economic and demographic conditions. 
These included a highly lucrative trade in 
forged documents as an estimated 50 per 
cent of Daraa inhabitants did not possess 
the required documents to travel to Jordan.15 
Due to the abundance of archeological sites 
in Daraa, smuggling antiquities, including of 
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items unearthed by the armed groups’ own 
excavation squads, developed into an indus-
try. This extremely profitable trade relied 
on collaboration with partners on the other 
side of Daraa’s borders, and with the links to 
transnational organized criminal networks 
(Sabi 2015).
The local actors’ interactions
Although small, JAN’s presence was impor-
tant in shaping the profit opportunities for 
the opposition armed groups. In May 2015, 
JAN, in collaboration with the FSA, temporar-
ily seized the main crossing on the Jordanian 
border at Nasib leading the border to be 
sealed.16 JAN troops spearheaded a looting 
of the crossing facilities and were joined by 
a large number of civilians (Reed 2015). The 
Jordanian government subsequently opened 
a new crossing, close to As-Sweida, managed 
through a tri-partite arrangement involving 
opposition armed groups, regime forces and 
Jordanians (Turkmani et al 2015). Under the 
new arrangements, goods and trucks, after 
crossing the Jordanian side of the border, had 
to be escorted by armed opposition for a fee 
to the nearest regime checkpoint where the 
trucks paid customs duty to the government. 
Only a small group of local businessmen 
could afford the multiple rounds of taxation; 
for many businessmen trade became prohib-
itive, negatively affecting the local economy 
(Arabi 2015). Compared to the volumes of 
trade and the commercial importance of the 
Nasib crossing, the inferior infrastructure 
of the new crossing, coupled with lengthy 
and unpredictable procedures, affected the 
supply of goods entering Daraa. Acute food 
shortages in Daraa followed the closure of 
Nasib. The commercial sale of humanitarian 
aid through the networks of traders linked 
to the armed groups intensified, causing fur-
ther strain on coping strategies.
A different type of arrangement, which 
ultimately benefited local population and 
the economy, was negotiated between the 
opposition and government forces around 
the supply of electricity. Opposition armed 
groups controlled a majority of the hydro-
electric dams in Daraa Province (Turkmani 
et al 2014). After government forces failed 
to capture the hydroelectric dams, an agree-
ment was reached to exchange water for 
electricity (Turkmani et al 2014). The elec-
tricity supply, however, remained vulnerable 
to the changing military objectives of the 
armed groups. For example, in February and 
December 2014, opposition forces attacked 
Khurbat Ghazala traction current converter 
plant that supplied Daraa with electricity 
leading to shortages (Turkmani et al 2014).
The opposition armed groups’ relations 
with the LACs differed. Whereas some com-
munication between the FSA and the LACs 
was maintained, there was no interaction 
between the Islam Army and the LACs. The 
LAC struggled, even with the FSA, to imple-
ment projects. For example, the LACs failed 
to get support from the FSA to implement a 
campaign to stop the digging of water wells 
which was causing water shortages, with a 
knock on economic effect by impairing veg-
etable growth and electricity generation.17 
Islamist groups, on the other hand, occa-
sionally interfered with civil society projects 
supported by the LACs to improve the liv-
ing conditions of the local population. This 
included them obstructing a project funded 
by the World Health Organization to set up a 
field hospital as they wanted control over the 
implementation of the project.18 Financial 
and military calculations driving the armed 
groups’ conduct also interfered with the 
LACs’ attempts to set up police and courts in 
Daraa. Armed groups set up their own judi-
cial body, whose priority was to deal with dis-
putes between the armed groups, including 
over the Nasib crossing. By taking over jus-
tice dispensation in Daraa, the armed groups 
controlled the smooth running of the com-
mercial routes, at the expense of the provi-
sion of law and order for the public.
Adding to the complicated relationship 
between the armed groups and the local 
population was the interference of the armed 
groups in the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
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Because some civilian bodies distributing aid 
in Daraa are linked to different armed groups, 
and because of poor monitoring of aid, those 
groups were able to influence the distribu-
tion of humanitarian aid according to politi-
cal loyalties and along kinship lines19. This 
enabled privileged access to goods to some 
sections of the local population and disad-
vantaged other (Turkmani et al 2015: 30).
Local population coping strategies
Commercial collaboration across the enemy 
lines, the heavy taxation of traded com-
modities and the manipulation of humani-
tarian aid, in combination, determined the 
availability and prices of goods and food in 
Daraa. In August 2015, one kilogram of rice 
cost SYP 338 in Daraa, compared with SYP 
158 in Damascus.20 Although various goods 
passed through the checkpoints along the 
government-controlled border, bread, which 
has been turned into a strategic commodity 
in the Syrian war, was not allowed through, 
even for a hefty bribe (Turkmani et al 2015: 
27; Martinez and Eng 2017; Ciezadlo 2015).
Besides the proliferation of criminal and 
illegal activities in Daraa, various forms of 
legal economy survived and new forms of 
economic activity developed. Notably, some 
agricultural production was sustained, par-
ticularly growing vegetables. Farmers could 
sell part of their crop to the government ter-
ritories, but were charged fees by the govern-
ment forces (Turkmani et al 2015). Relying 
on remittances, humanitarian aid and the 
ingenuity of some farmers in producing fod-
der for their livestock, more intensive farm-
ing was also possible in some areas. Olive oil 
extraction was one type of legal economy 
that benefited from new investment, includ-
ing from international sources. A profitable 
trade in solar devices developed in response 
to the demand created by the damage to elec-
tricity networks. The international humani-
tarian presence spurred cars sales and rental 
businesses. Collaboration between the 
regime forces and FSA facilitated remittances 
and cash transfers, and new money exchange 
offices opened. Some were co-owned by the 
FSA as the boundaries between legal and ille-
gal activities of war economy and their actors 
increasingly blurred.21
Opportunities for the local population to 
mitigate the harmful impact of war on their 
livelihoods involved a mixture of illegal and 
legal activities. Some people joined in smug-
gling; others seized on opportunities and 
adaptations to engage in formal economic 
activities; and some sections of the local pop-
ulation had to sell anything from livestock to 
houses, and personal possessions to survive.
Atareb – Extreme Criminality with Some 
‘Positive Externalities’?
Atareb is situated in the countryside of 
Aleppo, adjacent to the governorate of 
Idleb. Besides the international border with 
Turkey, Idleb has three informal internal 
borders: with the Syrian regime, with the 
area controlled by the Kurdish Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), and with the territory, 
which in February–June 2015, was con-
trolled by the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant 
(ISIL). Intense fighting between these par-
ties caused significant physical destruction 
across the governorate, with some areas par-
ticularly hard-hit. The electricity grid, whose 
core was in Aleppo, suffered extensive dam-
age (ACAPS 2014).
Atareb was seized by opposition forces 
early in the conflict. Due to its proximity with 
the Turkish border and the relatively low rate 
of military attacks for the governate, the area 
attracted an IDP population equivalent to a 
third of the domicile population (Turkmani 
et al 2015). The relative safety from military 
attacks meant that the largely agricultural 
area received a jolt from businesses relocat-
ing from other parts of Syria. These dynamics 
changed the economic profile of the area and 
created multiple economic opportunities in 
the war economy, particularly its legal part.
The criminal war economy and its protagonists
The two opposition armed groups, com-
posed largely of local fighters, had a strong 
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presence in Atareb in February-June 2015. 
While a multitude of armed groups, includ-
ing JAN and other Al Qaida affiliates, oper-
ated in Atareb’s surroundings, Ma’rouf 
Hazem and Shuhada Atareb of the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) were the dominant forces. Armed 
groups, supported by Turkey, enjoyed access 
to cross-border trade and controlled the main 
border crossings (Steenkamp 2017). The abil-
ity of armed groups to engage in illicit trade 
was enabled by this arrangement with trade 
in crude oil originating from the ISIL – and, 
to a lesser degree, Kurdish-controlled – ter-
ritories throughout Idleb and the Aleppo 
countryside, the main component of the 
criminal war economy (Steenkamp 2017; 
Vigual 2017). While the trade in oil incurred 
informal taxation at many checkpoints dot-
ted throughout the province, it was taxed 
at two locations in Atareb. One was a check-
point on the road to Turkey, and the other 
was a checkpoint on the road to Aleppo, 
operated by Ma’rouf Hazem and Shuhada 
Atareb members accordingly. Other goods, 
particularly those destined for the govern-
ment-controlled areas, incurred heavy taxes 
and truckloads of goods were frequently sto-
len by the various armed groups active in the 
area.
The presence of many armed groups in this 
region and a lax border regime with Turkey 
contributed to the proliferation of extreme 
forms of criminal activity (Schanzer and 
Tahiroglu 2014; ACAPS 2014). Kidnapping, 
trafficking in people, arms and drugs, trade 
in forged documents, and smuggling of 
antiquities thrived, and created a ‘regional 
conflict complex’ as suggested by the crimi-
nalization perspective on war economy (Pugh 
and Cooper 2004: 2). The presence of armed 
groups and organized criminal networks pre-
sented a risk to the physical safety of ordinary 
citizens, who otherwise faced few restric-
tions to free movement (ACAPS 2016).22 In 
terms of economic opportunities for the 
local population, mobility is important, and 
is undermined by the risks of kidnapping and 
robbery. Armed groups in Atareb were less 
involved in skimming humanitarian aid as it 
was distributed mostly by the LAC. In Idleb, 
however, the FSA occasionally engaged in an 
indirect form of extortion of the local popu-
lation by cutting the supply lines and taking 
food for their own troops (Sotloff 2013).
The local actors’ interactions
A thriving criminal war economy in Idleb and 
the Aleppo countryside was underpinned by 
mutually beneficial arrangements among 
the non-state armed groups. This included 
arrangements made with ISIL, which at the 
time had virtual monopoly on oil smuggling 
in Syria. Although trucks entering ISIL ter-
ritories were taxed by the opposition forces, 
ISIL could leverage its access to crude oil to 
obtain other concessions, including to avoid 
armed confrontation. However, such agree-
ments were subject to changing military 
calculations. For example, when factions of 
the Free Syrian Army clashed with ISIL, as in 
the northern countryside of Aleppo in Spring 
2015, the oil delivery route was disrupted 
leading to a hike in oil prices (Turkmani et 
al 2015).
There were also examples of collabora-
tion and conflict between the armed groups 
and government forces. For example, while 
there was intense fighting for the control 
of the road infrastructure in Idleb country-
side, opposition groups in Atareb collabo-
rated with government forces in Aleppo to 
help ease shortages caused by damage to the 
electricity infrastructure. This agreement fol-
lowed the military struggle, won by the FSA, 
for the control of the electricity distribution 
plants (Turkmani 2015: 53). The agreement, 
which enabled a more stable supply of elec-
tricity to Atareb, was jeopardized occasion-
ally because of each party’s military priorities 
(Turkmani 2015).
The relations between the opposition 
armed groups in Atareb and the LAC were 
established gradually and developed into a 
regularized form of cooperation. The founda-
tion of their relations was laid in a joint effort 
to repel ISIL’s attempts to capture Atareb in 
early 2014. In the aftermath, the FSA local 
brigades and the Atareb LAC agreed to move 
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the two checkpoints controlling the access 
to Atareb outside of the town perimeter. The 
checkpoints managed by the Ma’rouf Hazem 
and Shuhada Atareb brigades accrued sub-
stantial profits. The levies charged on goods 
were regulated by the local court, revenues 
were recorded and subsequently shared 
between the FSA and the LAC (Turkmani 
et al 2015: 60). This collaboration created a 
system of compliance between the armed 
groups and the civilian authority present in 
Atareb. The proceeds from those informally-
regulated and, in some ways, illegal trans-
actions given the ambiguous legal origins 
of some of the goods passing through the 
checkpoints, provided revenue for the two 
armed brigades and also for the LAC.23
Although the arrangements between the 
armed groups and the local civilian struc-
tures benefited the local population, the 
relationship between the armed groups and 
the local population remained uneasy. There 
was a perception that the FSA, in the words 
of one activist, ‘[…] only provided support 
to their soldiers, they were not interested in 
anyone else’ (Martinez and Eng 2017). The 
Ma’rouf Hazem brigade apparently kept close 
watch on the movement of goods and the 
origins of aid supplies making people suspi-
cious of their collaboration with the LACs.24
Local population coping strategies
The booming criminal economy in Atareb 
created a fluid and rapidly-changing environ-
ment in which the local population adapted 
its coping strategies. The arrangements 
between the opposition armed forces and 
ISIL provided access to fuel, which compared 
to many other opposition-controlled areas 
in Syria, helped ease the strain on everyday 
life. However, households and businesses 
depending on such arrangements for the 
regular supply of fuel were vulnerable to 
the fluctuating dynamics of the military and 
business interests of those groups. Electricity 
supply, which depended on running diesel-
fueled generators, was interrupted whenever 
military objectives disrupted the business 
arrangement over oil. Access to crude oil 
made oil refining a novel source of liveli-
hoods for many ordinary people; oil refining 
turned into a cottage industry and whatever 
was not locally-consumed, was sold across 
the border with Turkey (Yazigi 2014: 6; 
Steenkamp 2017: 10).
Versatile new businesses also developed 
in Atareb’s surrounding area, including in 
construction, retail trade and manufactur-
ing. The latter, for example, included the 
equipment needed for the oil smuggling 
business (Steenkamp 2017: 10; Al Abdeh 
2013). Spurred by armed groups’ criminal 
economic activities, repairing trucks used 
for oil transport also provided new forms of 
business. Manufacturing generators, mainly 
run by people who relocated their business 
to Atareb, also thrived due to the insufficient 
supply of electricity.
This stronger legal economy enabled the 
LAC in Atareb to raise its own revenue, how-
ever modest, by charging fees for electric-
ity, water, and sanitation services akin to 
a properly functioning public authority.25 
The LAC organized the purchase of flour 
and vegetables to control local food prices, 
which helped ease the strain of food short-
ages on the local population. The LAC also 
set up rudimentary security institutions such 
as a civil defense council and a police force, 
increasing the sense of order and security for 
the local population.26 The local economy 
was also propped up by the presence of inter-
national organizations able to operate in the 
broader area of Atareb due to the proximity 
of the open border with Turkey. Not all sec-
tions of the local population were able to 
benefit from either the criminal economy 
or the legal economy; many people still 
relied on subsistence farming and the sale of 
household possessions to survive.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored how the 
engagement of non-state armed groups in 
the criminal war economy affects the coping 
strategies that the local population develops 
to protect itself from their harmful impact, 
highlighting the interactions among various 
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actors and activities in the broader war econ-
omy. We have done so based on the propo-
sition that a criminality perspective in the 
mainstream scholarship on war economy 
fails to account for the adaptation in the 
broader economy and a variety of local pro-
cesses and interactions that may affect the 
response of local populations.
The criminal economy that has developed 
against the pre-war economic profile in 
three localities (Eastern Ghouta, Daraa and 
Atareb) varies in its profile and scale, ranging 
from that comprised mainly of the manipu-
lation of the supply of basic goods to full-
blown criminality. The interactions among 
its protagonists were influenced by their 
military/profit calculations and contingent 
on the resources available in the broader 
economy, which itself had been transformed 
by conflict, and its variable geography. The 
involvement of armed groups in criminal 
and illegal economic activity entailed differ-
ent forms and extents of coercion, varying 
from predation in the Eastern Ghouta siege, 
to less exposure to such practices in Daraa 
and Atareb. Local population coping strate-
gies varied as result. In contrast to Eastern 
Ghouta, where siege conditions pushed 
people to rely disproportionately on asset 
divestment with only limited alternatives 
for income generation, in Daraa and Atareb, 
more diverse opportunities existed in both 
the legal and illegal economies.
Syria presents an exceptionally fluid and 
diverse conflict context in which to study 
the link between war economy and everyday 
security. With coalitions in a perpetual state 
of flux, it is not always possible to clearly 
identify the actors. The insurgency is rela-
tively recent and heavily reliant on external 
patrons, which affects incentives to engage in 
local governance. The pre-existing social ties 
of armed groups, that is, their embeddedness 
in social relations, are good predictors for the 
type of arrangements that advance common 
interests, and hence civilian security. This 
kind of predisposition for engaging with 
the civilian structures was demonstrated 
in the Atareb case. Our analysis shows that 
whether and how such arrangements that 
are beneficial to civilian security material-
ize, is contingent on broader economic and 
political conditions that affect war economy 
micro-dynamics.
We do not underestimate the scale and 
severity of individual insecurity in each of 
the three cases we have studied, even in 
those seemingly positive instances, where 
the war economy offered more diverse copy-
ing strategies, notably Atareb. Nor do we 
overemphasize the significance and poten-
tial for sustaining some of the benefits from 
engagement in different areas of the war 
economy over the long-term. Equally, we 
do not overlook long-term economic, politi-
cal and social repercussions of criminal war 
economy and the challenge they present to 
post-war reconstruction. Rather, our analy-
sis points to a need for a more fine-grained 
examination of these dynamics, one that 
captures and explicates the different interac-
tions that produce an entangled illegal, and 
legal economy, their actors, and the wider 
public and private interests in conflict zones, 
which can affect civilian security in manifold 
ways. Every armed conflict and its locality 
has its salient war economy dynamics and 
actors, which are a product of endogenous 
and exogenous factors that shape the behav-
ior of the war economy participants. This 
diversity within and across countries is, by 
and large, obscured when looking at the war 
economy through a criminality lens, as has 
been the case in extant accounts of Syria’s 
war economy. Our analysis above attempts to 
overcome some of the conceptual and policy 
implications of maintaining a criminality-
focused perspective and enables the tailor-
ing of more context-specific responses.
Notes
 1 It has since changed its name to Hay’at 
Tahrir al_Sham (HTC).
 2 In the war economy scholarship border 
control is considered a strategic asset for 
the armed groups (Andreas 2009).
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 3 For the full description of the methodol-
ogy, see: Turkmani et al 2015.
 4 On the importance and difficulty of con-
ceptual clarification of ‘criminal’, ‘illegal’ 
and ‘illicit’ in war economy context, see: 
van Schendel and Abraham 2005.
 5 See: ‘Survey of Syria’s agriculture sec-
tor reveals impact of war’, available 
at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/
fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/
en/c/878242/.
 6 Interview with a member of civil society 
organisation which runs farming project 
in Daraa, 15 April 2015.
 7 Interview with traders and media rep-
resentatives based in Eastern Ghouta, 9 
May 2015.
 8 Syrian Untold. 27-7-2017. The Economic 
Map of Ghouta: Tunnels and ‘the Prince 
of Cheese’. Available at: http://www.
syriauntold.com/en/2017/07/the-eco-
nomic-map-of-ghouta-tunnels-and-the-
prince-of-cheese/.
 9 Syrian Untold. 27-7-2017. The Economic 
Map of Ghouta: Tunnels and ‘the Prince 
of Cheese’. Available at: http://www.
syriauntold.com/en/2017/07/the-eco-
nomic-map-of-ghouta-tunnels-and-the-
prince-of-cheese/.
 10 See http://stepagency-sy.net/archives/ 
36463.
 11 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian 
Arab Republic 2016, www.reliefweb.net.
 12 Smart Media, Smuggling between Sweida 
and Daraa under the regime’s eyes. 16 
March 2016. https://smartnews-agency.
com/ar/wires/165994.
 13 Enab Baladi, Deraa- The regime controls 
electricity and smugglers provide diesel 
through the desert. http://www.enabba-
ladi.net/archives/98782.
 14 Almodon, Corruption in Swedia. 1 
May 2016, http://www.almodon.com/
arabworld/2016/5/1/.
 15 Humanitarian Needs Overview-Syrian 
Arab Republic 2016.
 16 Nasib closed for the 4th day and the 
losses are $100million, Bal Arabi, 4 April 
2015.; What is the significance of Nasib 
crossing, Al Jazeera, 17 April 2015. 
 17 Skype interview with a member of local 
administrative councils unit, 7 March 
2015.
 18 Skype interview with a member of local 
administrative councils unit, 7 March 
2015.
 19 Al Ghad, Al Rukban Camp: Humanitarian 
aid is not reaching all refugees, 
18 June 2017. http://alghad.com/
articles/1677222.
 20 Smart Media, Smuggling between Sweida 
and Daraa under the regime’s eyes. 16 
March 2016. https://smartnews-agency.
com/ar/wires/165994.
 21 Interview with a member of Syrian civil 
society organisation based in Daraa, 8 
April 2015.
 22 Interview with traders and members of 
civil society organisations based in Idleb, 
10 April 2015.
 23 Interview with a member of the local 
administrative council in Atareb, 5 May 
2015.
 24 Interview with a member of the local 
administrative council in Atareb, 5 May 
2015.
 25 Interview with a member of the local 
administrative council in Atareb, 5 May 
2015.
 26 Interview with a member of the local 
administrative council in Atareb, 5 May 
2015.
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